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Abstract 
The distribution of well-being in society and comparisons of well-being across societies depend 
both on the amount of inequality at the national level and also on the national average level of 
well-being.  Comparisons between the U.S. and western Europe show that inequality is greater in 
the U.S. but that average GDP/capita is also greater in the U.S., and most Americans have higher 
standards of living than do Western Europeans at comparable locations in their national income 
distributions.  What is less well-known is that (depending on the country) much or all of this gap 
arises from differences in the level of working hours in the U.S. and in Western Europe.  Cross-
national comparisons of well-being have typically relied on the methodology of generalized 
Lorenz curves (GLC), but this approach privileges disposable income and cash transfers while 
ignoring other aspects of welfare state and labor market structure that potentially affect the 
distribution of well-being in a society.  We take an alternative approach that focuses on the value 
of time use and the different distributions of work and family time that are generated by each 
country’s labor market and social welfare institutions. We show that reasonable estimates of the 
greater contribution to well-being from non-market activities such as the raising of children or 
longer vacations overturn claims in the literature that the U.S. offers greater well-being to more 
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Well-being in more and less egalitarian countries 
Are people better off in a country that is more egalitarian or in one that is less egalitarian?  This 
question, which has been debated for centuries, has no easy answer.  Some scholars argue that 
inequality arises naturally from economic activity and that constraints on the production of 
inequality are by their nature government-induced constraints on individual freedom.  From this 
perspective, they have argued that equality limits freedom and thus is inferior on moral grounds 
to inequality.  Others observe that inequality can also limit the freedom of action of the relatively 
poor, both because those from disadvantaged backgrounds are handicapped in their efforts to 
compete for material rewards in the marketplace and because the rich are able to use money to 
gain disproportionate influence on outcomes in the political process.  
A second major issue concerns how inequality affects material standard of living.  As 
many scholars have noted, increases in inequality with fixed aggregate income or wealth make 
many people worse off in order that a few people are better off.  If everyone has equal moral 
worth, and if there are diminishing returns to wealth, then it is easy to show that society is worse 
off under such transfers.  However, others argue that inequality promotes growth by increasing 
the incentives for productive economic activity.  If true, the increase in aggregate income can in 
theory make people who are lower in the income distribution better off than they would be if 
incomes were spread more equally. 
In practice, the comparison between more equal and less equal societies is made difficult 
by the complex way that income is earned and redistributed in modern societies.  The welfare 
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state provides in-kind services as well as monetary transfers.  To some extent, these transfers 
redistribute income from high earners to low earners, but they also smooth income for the same 
individual over his or her life course.  The welfare state also affects the distribution of income 
through its regulation of the labor market, and labor unions also affect distribution by negotiating 
the provision of non-monetary and monetary benefits for their members.  The complexity of the 
bundle of income and services makes it difficult to establish the precise distribution of social 
welfare within even one society, let alone the extent to which aggregate welfare differs between 
societies. 
The difficulty of obtaining a comprehensive comparison of social welfare across countries 
calls instead for efforts to evaluate major components of societal difference in order to evaluate 
their potential importance in the overall societal comparison.  Garfinkel, Rainwater, and 
Smeeding (2005), for example, recently made an effort to evaluate the impact of education and 
health benefits on the distribution of wellbeing across a set of industrialized countries.  They 
found that the inclusion of these benefits substantially narrows differences in inequality between 
the U.S. and a set of Western European countries because the U.S. spends such a large amount of 
its GDP on education and especially on health care than do European societies, including on 
those lower in the income distribution.  However, the conclusion they reached is sensitive both to 
assumptions about the distribution of these benefits, and also (and perhaps more critically) on 
their assumption about whether Americans (and particularly lower-income Americans) get as 
much health and education per dollar of expenditure as do Europeans.  Other scholars (Rainwater 
and Smeeding 1997) have demonstrated the impact of a nation’s demographic structure on cross-
national differences in inequality. 
In this paper, we address a different component of cross-national differences.  Aside from 
the structure of taxes and social welfare benefits, perhaps the most obvious difference between 
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countries commonly called liberal social welfare states and the social democratic and 
conservative welfare states concerns working hours.  There is a large difference in the average 
working hours in the United States and in many parts of Western Europe.  While Western 
Europeans once worked more than Americans, they steadily reduced their hours of work 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s to the point where they now work substantially fewer hours than 
do Americans.  There are four major components to this difference.  The first concerns the 
retirement age; Western Europeans have retired at earlier ages than Americans since the 1980s.  
The second concerns unemployment.  Unemployment rates in many Western European societies 
were much lower than American rates in the 1960s, but they climbed above U.S. levels by the 
1980s or early 1990s, and are often targeted as a societal “cost” of lower inequality in Europe.  A 
third component is the shorter number of weeks worked per year (including paid vacation weeks) 
and hours worked per week by the typical working-age adult in Europe.  These differences are 
partly linked to the successful efforts of European unions to reduce the definition of full-time 
work relative to the U.S., and also stem from the greater accommodation that many European 
societies have made to the dual demands of work and family via maternity leave and the 
availability of part-time work for working mothers.  The fourth component concerns vacation 
time, with paid vacations typically much longer in Western European societies than in the United 
States. 
Taken together, these components comprise a striking difference between the typical 
hours of work per capita or per worker in the United States and the typical western European 
society. Table 1 displays statistics from the OECD Employment Outlook about work hours per 
capita and work hours per worker.  Per capita working hours in the Netherlands, France, and 
Germany – to take only a few examples - are less than 80% of the American level.  The source of 
this discrepancy is partly due to a higher employment to population ratio in the U.S. than in most 
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European countries, but the average worker in the U.S. also works more hours than does his or 
her European counterpart.  The average French job has only 90% of the hours of the average 
American job, while the average Dutch job has only 80% of the hours of the average American 
job.  
Relative to the differences in work hours, differences in productivity in the U.S. and 
Western Europe are much smaller, as can be seen in the GDP per hour worked data from Table 1. 
These data show that several European countries including the Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Norway, and Ireland all had higher GDP per hour worked than did the U.S.  However, the GDP 
per capita was 18% lower in the Netherlands than in the U.S. in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
adjusted currency, 22% lower in Belgium, and 28% lower in France.  A similar pattern applies to 
other western European countries.  The German GDP per working hour was 91% of the U.S., but 
the GDP per capita is 29% lower than in the U.S., while in Sweden the 11% gap in GDP per 
working hour grows to a 22% gap in GDP per capita. 
- Table 1 about here - 
Whether someone would prefer to live in a European welfare state or a liberal market-
oriented society certainly depends in large part on where the person is located in the skills and 
earnings distributions. Someone with poor job opportunities would probably prefer a welfare 
state where his income is raised by security benefits. A very successful worker, on the other hand, 
might prefer a liberal welfare state where taxes are lower and earnings are high at the top of the 
distribution. But which country would a randomly chosen risk-neutral individual typically 
choose?  The most plausible answer is that he would choose the country where he was more 
likely to be better off. Generalized Lorenz curves provide a way of operationalizing this 
calculation. If the populations of two countries are ranked on the same metric, the cross-over 
point indicates the percentile-ranges that are better off in each country.  The location of the cross-
 7
over point depends both upon the shape of the two distributions and on differences in the average 
income.  At one extreme, where average incomes are the same but where the top earning person 
earned almost all the income in the less-egalitarian country, then 99.99+% of the population in 
the more equal country would be better off than their counterparts (in percentile terms) in the less 
equal country. It would also be possible for average incomes to be the same but for the majority 
of the population in a more unequal country to be better off than their counterparts in a more 
equal country.1  Generalized Lorenz curves also demonstrate the potentially critical importance of 
aggregate income in determining the relative standing of two populations. A large majority of the 
population in a high-inequality country may be better off than their counterparts in a more 
egalitarian country solely because the aggregate per-capita income in the inegalitarian country is 
significantly greater than in the egalitarian country.  
The large difference in hours worked between the U.S. and several of the Western 
European welfare states creates just this situation. Figure 1 shows generalized Lorenz curves for 
the U.S., France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, where the cumulative shares of income in each 
of these countries is compared to total income in the U.S. after conversion to U.S. dollars based 
on PPP.2  Figure 2 then shows hypothetical generalized Lorenz curves that would be obtained if 
the incomes of France, Belgium and the Netherlands were scaled up so that the average working 
hours of these countries equaled the average working hours in the U.S.3  In the actual GLCs, the 
American distribution overtakes the Belgian and Dutch distributions at the 30th percentile. This 
implies that the bottom 30% of the population in the Netherlands and Belgium are better off than 
their counterparts in the U.S., but that most Americans are better off than most inhabitants of 
either of these two European countries.  The American distribution is actually higher than the 
French distribution at all quantiles.  However, if the European distributions were scaled up to the 
point where average working hours were the same as in the U.S., the actual overtaking point for 
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the U.S. would be at the 60th percentile for France, at the 80th percentile for the Netherlands, and 
not until the 95th percentile for Belgium.  Clearly, almost all the income advantage in the U.S. 
stems from the greater amount of work done by American workers relative to their European 
counterparts.   
The European pattern of work hours stems partly from specific features of European 
social welfare and labor market institutions.   More generous pension and unemployment benefits 
might lower the incentive to work (Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2003).  Higher wages for low skill 
labor or higher employer taxes to pay for social benefits might lead to a reduced demand for labor 
and thus an overall reduction in average working hours  in European countries (Berdasi and 
Gornick, 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2002). Within the context of an approach such as that used by 
Garfinkel et al. (2005), the reduced hours becomes a cost of the welfare state through reduced 
aggregate income, which may or may not be made up by the economic value of the 
unemployment compensation, pensions, or maternity benefits that are provided by the state or by 
employers.  Some conservative commentators (such as David Brooks of the New York Times) 
have taken this reduction of working hours to be an indication that munificent social welfare 
states are not viable in the long-term because of large reduction in aggregate income related to the 
lowered average work time. 
If the loss of income from the reduced working hours were the cost of heightened 
equality, it would appear that the price is very high.  If instead, the people of western Europe are 
gaining a benefit to the reduction in work hours that offsets the income loss, then it becomes 
important to incorporate this benefit in any systematic comparison between these countries and 
the United States.  We demonstrate the importance of non-work hours through a comparison of 
the U.S. and the Netherlands. 
- Figures 1 and 2 about here - 
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Non-working time and well-being 
Scholars do not all agree on the proper interpretation of the lower working hours in 
western Europe. Some see the lower work hours as forced and therefore as representing a net loss 
in aggregate well-being.  Prescott (2004), for example, recently argued that the work-hours 
difference is due to the tax systems of the U.S. and European countries, although his study 
implies elasticities that are too high to be believable by many economists (Alesina, 2005). Others 
argue that the lower levels of work in Europe are forced on European workers by employers who 
lower labor demand in response to the high costs of labor regulation and of employer taxes that 
help pay the costs of the European welfare states (Berdasi and Gornick, 2000; Blau and Kahn 
2002). This conception does not apply to the Netherlands even though Dutch welfare state 
benefits are generous. First, the unemployment rate in the Netherlands has been lower than that in 
the United States in every year since 1997, while the employment-to-population ratio in the two 
countries is very similar.  Second, calculations on Dutch data (OSA Labour Supply Panel 2002, 
see Appendix A for results) show that only 6% of Dutch employees report that they would like to 
work more hours than they do at the moment; only one third of this group think that they will not 
be able to realize their preference for more working hours within one year; and only about half of 
these ‘pessimists’ mention demand side factors as a reason for their expected inability to work as 
many hours as they would like. In other words, only about one percent of employees in the 
Netherlands actually feel constrained due to demand side factors.  
Other authors agree that non-working time has value and therefore offsets reductions in 
well-being from the foregone income: non-working time offers the opportunity to be with one’s 
children, to spend time on hobbies and to feel less stressed out (Osberg 2002a; Osberg 2002b). 
Blanchard (2004) argues that the higher work levels of Americans stem from the American 
preference for higher levels of consumption as opposed to higher levels of leisure.  Alesina et al 
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(2005) show through a series of analyses that union and regulation variables can statistically 
explain the bulk of the difference in hours worked in the U.S. and Western Europe.  They 
theorize that the coordinated reduction in work and expansion of vacation expands the utility of 
leisure time and reinforces the desire in Europe for what Alesina et al called “vacation en masse,” 
as evidenced by the fact that people who work fewer hours report higher levels of happiness in 
the Eurobarometer surveys.  Meanwhile, Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie (2006) report in their 
trend analysis of time diaries that American mothers actually spend as much or more time with 
their children than do Dutch mothers both if they are employed and if they are not employed, 
while American fathers spend nearly as much time with children as do Dutch fathers.  What 
suffers in the U.S., according to the data analyzed by Bianchi et al, is the amount of time spent 
with one’s spouse, time spent with friends, time for civic pursuits, sleep time, and leisure time, 
and this shortfall produces a heightened feeling of time strain among American working parents.   
The Dutch OSA data endorse the view that non-working time contributes to well-being. 
Table 2 shows that two thirds of the part-time workers claim not to work full-time because they 
want to have enough time for household and caring tasks. Another 12 percent mention having 
enough time for hobbies as the reason.  Reported health problems are a third reason given by 
Dutch adults for not working and not looking for a job. Taken together, these statistics give the 
impression that the Dutch assign positive value to the hours of non-work time that they gain by 
not being full-time workers.  Our task is to incorporate this value into comparative studies of 
well-being. 
- Table 2 about here - 
Almost by definition, non-working time has at least the value of the earnings that one 
foregoes when the decision not to work is voluntary.  Imagine, for example, a mother who 
attaches high value to raising her children herself and therefore chooses a part-time job even 
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though it carries the loss of potential income.4  If we expressed well-being purely in terms of 
income, we would conclude that her choice of fewer working hours and a corresponding 
reduction in household income would produce a net reduction in well-being. This interpretation, 
however, would clearly give an overly narrow and hence unrealistic picture of the situation. If a 
mother who has the choice to work full time or part time chooses to work part time, she by 
definition values the added time that she spends with her family, child, and friends at least as 
much as the income she foregoes by not working.  She has accepted a lower income in exchange 
for a living situation that she values more than what she gives up.  Because her time use is part of 
her well-being, the correct interpretation of a strictly voluntary choice is that her well-being is 
higher than it would be if she worked full time.5 
One objection to this interpretation might be that mothers make their decision about labor 
supply in the context of their partner’s situation, and feel that a decision to work more hours 
would require a corresponding drop in their partner’s hours because of the high value they place 
on family care of the children. But this objection does not undermine the above interpretation; it 
would still be true that women (and men) accept the drop in household income as an acceptable 
price for the opportunity to combine childcare with time for spouse, friends, and other leisure 
activities. 
A second possible objection concerns the costs and availability of child care. If child care 
of a given quality was simply much more expensive in one country than in the other, then a 
greater net reduction of work hours in the first country might be a response to child care prices 
rather than a true difference in preferences.  In this case, the higher cost of child care would 
produce a true reduction in well-being. 
With respect to the U.S. and the Netherlands, this objection appears to be unfounded.  
Available evidence (Immervoll and Barber 2005) suggests that the price structure for child care is 
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not materially different in the two countries.  The fees charged by child care centers in the 
Netherlands are higher - 29% of an average production worker’s wages (APW) – than the 18% in 
the U.S., but this difference in fees does not take into account rebates, childcare benefits and tax 
reductions, all of which affect the net cost of child care.  The net out-of-pocket costs as a percent 
of the average production wage (APW) are lower for couples with two full-time earnings in the 
Netherlands than in the U.S. at household incomes equaling 200% of the APW, and the country-
gap in favor of the Netherlands is even larger when family income is lower.  Child care subsidies 
imply a higher implicit marginal tax on income and this must be taken into account to get an 
accurate comparison of well-being.  However, as we show later in the paper, these implicit tax 
rates are not large enough to offset the argument that Dutch women gain net positive value from a 
voluntary reduction in work hours. 
The failure to include the value of non-work time in calculations of national well-being 
amounts to treating the consumption of goods and the choice of non-work activities 
asymmetrically, which does not make good theoretical sense.  The fallacy can best be appreciated 
through a simple example concerning the utility gained from consumption of goods and services.  
Imagine that the population of two countries have identical income distributions but differ 
strongly in their consumption preferences, with people in one country having a much stronger 
preference for cars than do people in a second country.  If the income distributions in the two 
countries were recomputed using after-tax and also after-car-purchase income, it would appear 
that people were on-average worse off in the country with the higher preference for cars, and so a 
proper comparison should use pre-car purchase disposable income, which corresponds exactly to 
the logic of including the value of time in comparisons of well-being.  With respect to the car 
example, one could object to the inclusion of pre-car purchase income if the excess car purchases 
in the first country were not a voluntary choice, but rather were forced upon people by some 
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adverse condition in their environment, such as low-density communities or the denial of mass 
transit options in opposition to the preferences of the country’s population.  If, for example, a 
denial of mass transit were the only reason for the country difference in the rate of car purchases, 
it would in fact be more accurate to compute the distribution of well-being in the two countries 
on an after car-purchase/after mass-transit-cost basis.  The issues raised by this hypothetical 
example are identical to the issues raised by cross-national differences in the distribution of non-
work time, and so in this paper we formally treat time in the same way we treat consumption in 
order to explore its potential importance for cross-national comparisons of living standards. 
The issues raised by cross-national differences in paid vacation time are in many respects 
similar to the issues raised by non-work time.  However, there is relatively little variation in 
vacation time in the Netherlands, and so workers cannot as easily express an individual 
preference for longer-vacations and less pay relative to shorter vacations and higher pay.  The 
growth in the length of paid vacations in the Netherlands was the product of a series of 
agreements between Dutch labor unions and Dutch employers, and the content of these 
agreements then diffused to cover most of the Dutch work force (Alesina et al 2005).  The 
country differences therefore are not the direct consequence of individual preferences in the U.S. 
and the Netherlands.  Another reason why the typical difference in paid vacation time does not 
imply differing individual tradeoffs between income and leisure is that the Dutch are typically 
paid for their longer vacations and holidays.  Clearly, however, there must be a tradeoff; it is a 
standard result in labor economics that workers indirectly pay for a large share of non-wage 
benefits through lower hourly wages.  In this paper we consider the impact of adjustments for 
cross-national differences in both hours of work and paid vacations and holidays on cross-
national differences in the quality of life as implied by income statistics. 
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As noted earlier, the U.S. and the Netherlands differ in their level of inequality and differ 
greatly in average working hours.  The Netherlands has relatively low poverty and low inequality 
compared with the U.S. both because of its more equal distribution of market income and because 
of the redistributive impact of the Dutch welfare state (Rainwater and Smeeding 1997).  
Meanwhile, out of 10 OECD countries studied by Jacobs and collaborators, the U.S. has the 
highest number of working hours and the Netherlands the lowest: 1976 versus 1368 annual hours 
for individuals or 72.3 versus 51.9 weekly hours for couples (Jacobs and Gornick 2001, Jacobs 
and Gerson 2004).  An important reason for the low number of working hours in the Netherlands 
is the huge proportion of part-time working women: 58 percent of the employed women in the 
Netherlands works less than 30 hours a week, compared to 41 percent in the U.K., 34 percent in 
Germany, 24 percent in France, 21 percent in Sweden, and only 16 percent in U.S. (OECD 2000). 
In addition, the average number of paid vacation weeks varies from 3.9 in the United States to 7.6 
in the Netherlands. 
These differences in work time correspond to attitudinal differences between the Dutch 
and the Americans that show a much stronger family orientation in the Netherlands.  Table 3 
shows that Dutch adults are much more likely than Americans to state that they will hard only if 
it doesn’t interfere with their family life.  In contrast, a majority of Americans report that they 
would give priority to work even if their family life suffered.  These striking differences in 
attitudes and work behavior make the two cases of the U.S. and the Netherlands very suitable for 
evaluating how country differences in non-work time affect cross-national comparisons of well-
being.  
--Table 3 about here-- 
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Analytic Strategy  
 Our approach consists of three steps. First, we make a baseline comparison of the income 
distributions of the U.S. and the Netherlands for households where the head was between 25 and 
55 years of age; this age range was chosen to exclude most of the retirement-related behavior 
from our comparison. Second, we construct an adjustment measure for both countries that raises 
the income of satisfied part-timers – meaning those work part-time instead of full-time on a 
voluntary basis-- to a full-time income, and we then measure the impact of this adjustment on 
cross-national comparisons of well-being. Finally, we construct a second adjustment measure that 
also takes the value of vacation time into account, and again we compare the distribution of well-
being in the two countries after accounting for the value of both types of nonwork time..  
For the United States, we analyzed data from the 2000 March Current Population Survey, 
which is the survey that is incorporated in the Luxembourg Income Study (Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) Micro database 1999-2000). For the Netherlands, we made use of two datasets.  The 
1999 data come from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), which is the Dutch contribution to 
the Luxembourg Income Study.  We supplemented these data with 2000 data from the Family 
Survey Dutch Population (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 2000). The LIS/SEP 
consists of 2,717 households with positive incomes where the head was between 25 and 55 years 
old, while the Family Survey Dutch Population contains information on 554 households with 
these characteristics. Personal disposable household income was operationalized in the usual way 
as the sum of earned and unearned income plus government transfers and credits and minus 
taxes.6 In line with LIS recommendations and general practice, top and bottom coding have been 
applied, since people tend to underestimate very low incomes and overestimate very high 
incomes (Kenworthy 2004). Incomes lower than 1 percent of the mean are set to 1% of the mean 
income, and incomes over 10 times the median are set to 10 times the median income.  
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In order to make comparisons of income across countries, it is important to establish 
whether the micro-level measures of income are equally accurate across the countries.  A 
standard approach for doing this is to compare the estimate of national income obtained by 
aggregating the income reported in sample surveys with estimates obtained from national 
accounts data.  We have done this for the American data and for the two surveys for the 
Netherlands.  In the Dutch case, we compared the estimate of the population household 
disposable income estimated from the two surveys with household net disposable income for 
1999 and 2000 from the annual accounts by institutional sector that are reported by Statistics 
Netherlands. We found that the Family Survey Dutch Population accounted for 87.8% of the 
income reported in the national accounts, and that the Dutch LIS/SEP data accounted for 88.9% 
of the income reported by national accounts. For the American case, we relied on the recent 
report from the Ruser, Pilot and Nelson (2004), who compared personal income reported in the 
national accounts data and in the 2002 March CPS.  The population estimate of money income in 
the CPS was $6.446 trillion, which compares with $8.678 trillion reported in the state personal 
income figures reported to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Most of this discrepancy 
consists of income received on behalf of individuals by pension plans, nonprofit institutions 
serving households, and fiduciaries. After adjusting for all differences in the types of income 
collected by these two methods, the authors identified an $804 billion shortfall in the CPS, which 
implies that the CPS accounted for 88.9% of the comparable income reported in the U.S. national 
accounts data, which is very similar to the figures obtained for the Netherlands. These 
calculations do not prove that the datasets are comparable because they do not measure the same 
thing (the Dutch calculation is after taxes, while the U.S. calculation is before taxes), and because 
the social welfare and tax systems are quite different in the two countries.  Nonetheless, they do 
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suggest at least rough comparability in the data, which supports the utility of the analyses 
reported in this paper.  
In order to make the two Dutch surveys even more comparable with each other, we scaled 
them by the ratio of their fractions of national accounts income, but this standardization is so 
small as to be unnoticeable in the charts to follow. We then converted household income to 
household equivalent income by dividing household incomes by the square root of household 
size. Finally, we made incomes comparable between the two countries by re-expressing them in 
purchase power parities in 2000 US dollars (Firebaugh 1999). Conversion factors have been 
derived from the OECD (2000-euro = .925 2000-US dollar, http://www.oecd.org). For the Dutch 
LIS/SEP data, first a conversion into euros (1 euro = 2.20371 guilders) and into 2000 consumer 
prices (1999-euro = .974 2000-euro, Statistics Netherlands, statline.cbs.nl) was required. For the 
Family Survey Dutch Population 2000 only a conversion from guilders into euros was needed 
before applying the PPP conversion.  
A central issue for our analysis is whether individuals who work less than full time do so 
voluntarily.  For the United States, this information is available in the 1998 General Social 
Survey. For the Netherlands, we used the OSA Labour Supply Panel data of 2002 collected by 
the Institute for Labour Studies. Both sources contain the question whether one prefers to work 
more, fewer, or the same number of hours a week, given that the wage rate remains the same. The 
distribution of preferences for work hours differs strongly between the United States and the 
Netherlands.  According to Table 4, three quarters of Dutch employees are satisfied with their 
present working hours and related income situation, whereas the proportion of Americans who 
would not want to change their work hours is only 57 percent. The proportion that prefers fewer 
hours is higher among the Dutch than among the Americans, and more Americans than Dutch 
prefer to increase their hours and income (panel A). American and Dutch part-time working 
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women are more satisfied with their work schedules than their full-time working counterparts.  In 
contrast, many part-time American men are not satisfied and want to work more (panel B). 
Because the proportion of part-time workers is larger in the Netherlands than in the United States 
and because more Dutch than Americans are satisfied, the size of the group of satisfied part-
timers is much larger in the Netherlands. One third of the Dutch work force consists of part-time 
workers who do not want to change their work hours, while only 9% of American workers fall 
into this category (panel C).  
- Table 4 about here - 
We used the information from the OSA Labour Supply Panel data of 2002 to adjust the 
incomes reported in the Dutch SEP and the Family Survey Dutch Population.  Using the OSA 
data, we assigned full-time earnings to all part-time workers who expressed a preference for the 
same or fewer working hours and then computed the percentage difference between original and 
adjusted income for all twenty quantiles of the Dutch income distribution. When adjusting the 
incomes of satisfied part-time workers to full-time incomes, we calculated full time income as the 
observed wage rate times 39 hours for both the Netherlands and the U.S. (the average number of 
working hours for Dutch full-timers is 39 hours, while the average in the U.S. is 46 hours). We 
then applied these quantile adjustments to the Dutch 1999 LIS/SEP data and also to the 2000 
Family Survey Dutch Population. For the American case, we used the 1998 General Social 
Survey, which contains a question about whether one would prefer to work more and earn more, 
work the same and earn the same, or work less and earn less. The adjustment measure is 
constructed similarly as for the Netherlands, and the result was then used to adjust quantiles of 
the income distribution as calculated with the 2000 CPS.7  
These adjustments can only be an approximation of the true value of the non-worked 
hours of satisfied part-time workers.  This value, which in economics is commonly referred to as 
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the reservation wage, is heterogeneous in the population.  Figure 3 shows the result for a 
hypothetical portion of the income distribution, which we define as those with identical 
household incomes, identical part-time wages, and an identical number of work hours. For 
simplicity, we show the distribution as a normal distribution which is truncated at €12, which in 
this figure represents the per hour average net increment in disposable income that would be 
obtained by working full-time instead of part-time for satisfied part-timers. Because these part-
timers are satisfied, the value distribution is truncated on the left; if any of the voluntary part-
timers assigned a lower value to non-work time, they would by definition be working instead.   
Because the tax systems of both countries are progressive, our approximation is above the 
lower-bound of its value for this population.  However, we still conclude that our estimate is 
conservative, in the sense that it is below the mean value for this subpopulation. Note that even if 
the distribution is symmetrical, the left truncation creates a right skew and pushes the mean above 
the median. For our measure to be too high, it would have to be true that a flattening of the tax 
system (such that the hourly take home pay on the non-worked hours by satisfied part-time 
workers would equal the hourly take home pay on the worked hours) would all by itself draw 
more than 50% of the satisfied part-timers into the full-time labor market. The Netherlands has a 
large fraction of women working part-time throughout the income distribution, and notably also 
in the bottom third of the income distribution, where the Dutch income tax was relatively flat in 
the period covered by our data.  This fact suggests that the labor supply response to a flat tax 
would not be as large as 50%, and therefore our adjustment for part-time work is conservative.8 
Further evidence that our assigned value is conservative comes from considerations of the 
wage elasticity of supply.  Goldin (1990) reported a range of estimated wage elasticities of supply 
for American women from various studies as between 0.4 and 0.8 for the 1950-1980 period.  Van 
Soest et al. (1990) estimated a wage elasticity of supply for Dutch women of 0.66.  Our data 
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show that the average Dutch female part-time worker works about 20 hours per week.  If 50% of 
these workers became full-time workers, this would raise their average work hours to 30.  The 
wage elasticity of supply is defined as 
 / /L L w wηΔ = Δ  
where L is labor supply and w is the net (after tax) wage.  If  /L LΔ  is 0.5 (a 50% increase) , then 
/w wΔ  must equal 0.5/0.66, which equals .76, a 76% increase.  So let W be the gross wage, let 1r  
be the existing “high” tax rate and 2r  be a new “low” tax rate that would cause the average net 
wage for the additional hours worked to equal the average net wage on the actual hours worked.  
Since the net wage from the flat tax must be 1.76 of the net wage from the existing tax rate, it 
follows that  
    2 1(1 ) 1.76(1 )r W r W− = −  
And so 
 2 11.76 .76r r= −  
This implies a reduction in the marginal tax rate from 40% to 0%, or from 50% to 12.5%, or from 
60% to 30%.  These steps are considerably larger than the typical step-ups in the Dutch tax across 
the quantiles of the Dutch income distribution.  It follows, therefore, that our estimates of the 
average monetary value of non-work time for Dutch satisfied part-time workers across the 
income quantiles are conservative estimates of their actual value. 
We have no data that show the proportion of workers in the Netherlands and the U.S. who 
would voluntarily give up their vacations for more paid work hours. However, we can illustrate 
the maximum potential impact of the cross-national difference in well-being in the two countries 
by assuming that all of the vacation time in both countries is preferred over work, and by valuing 
the vacation time in both countries as equal to the length of the vacation multiplied by each 
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person’s wage. According to the OECD (2004) (see also Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005), 
the average length of holidays and vacation time in the Netherlands for full-year equivalent 
workers is 7.6 weeks a year, while in the United States the average is 3.9 weeks a year for full-
year household heads. Using the Dutch LIS/SEP data and the CPS data, we computed the number 
of weeks worked per year for workers located in each 5% quantile of both the Dutch and the U.S. 
household income distribution. We assumed that the average length of vacations and holidays in 
each quantile was the country average multiplied by the ratio of the average weeks worked in that 
income quantile divided by 52. We then assumed that the monetary value of this vacation and 
holiday time equaled the number of weeks of vacation multiplied by that person’s wage, and we 
added this quantity to the household income of each person. The percentage difference per 5% 
quantile between the original unadjusted household income and the household income adjusted 
for voluntary part-time work and vacation time is the adjustment measure we applied to the top 
and bottom coded, size-adjusted and PPP adjusted equivalent household income for the U.S. and 
the Netherlands. This valuation makes similar assumptions as was earlier discussed in the part-
time adjustment and has the same offsetting biases; on the one hand, people would get less 
money for the additional work because of the progressive tax system, but on the other hand, their 
valuation of vacation time may be higher than the foregone earnings even under a flat tax.   
Results: well-being adjusted for satisfaction with working hours and vacation time 
Table 5 shows the average incomes per 5% quantile before and after adjustment, while 
Figure 4 compares the ranked household size-adjusted disposable income distributions of the 
Netherlands and the U.S.. The cross-over point (the point at which Americans are better off than 
their Dutch equivalents on ranked income) is between the 20th and 25th percentile when the CPS 
is compared with the Family Survey and is between the 35th and 40th percentile when the CPS is 
compared with the Dutch LIS/SEP data. The income advantage in the American distribution 
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remains fairly small through the bottom half of the distribution, but above that point, the 
American advantage is marked and becomes very large above the 80th percentile. Table 5 shows 
that the mean income in the Family Survey is only 74% of the mean CPS income, while the mean 
Dutch LIS/SEP income is only 76% of the mean CPS income. 
- Table 5 and Figure 4 about here - 
Figure 5 then takes account of the value of non-work time of satisfied part-time workers in the 
two countries.  Naturally, the adjusted income lines lie above the original income lines for both 
countries, because we have monetarized the value of non-work time for satisfied part-time 
workers. However, because a greater portion of Dutch workers are satisfied to work less than full 
time than is true in the U.S., the adjustment is larger in the Netherlands. As a consequence of this 
adjustment, the Dutch mean incomes have risen to 78% and 80% of the mean CPS income for the 
Family Survey and the Dutch LIS/SEP, respectively. The cross-over point for the CPS and the 
Family Survey has not changed, but the cross-over point for the CPS and the Dutch LIS/SEP has 
moved to between 45 and 50%, which means that nearly half the Dutch households – specifically 
those in the lower half of the income distribution – are better off than their American 
counterparts.  Furthermore, the income gap between American and Dutch households in the 
upper half of the distribution has also noticeably shrank, although the American households are 
still clearly better off. 
- Figure 5 about here - 
Figure 6 shows the consequence of combining the adjustment for the monetary value of 
non-working time for satisfied part-time workers with the monetary value of vacations and 
holidays. The vacation adjustment obviously increased equivalent household income in both 
countries, because now each household gained the monetary value of vacation time as well as the 
monetary value of the difference between part-time and full-time hours per year for satisfied part-
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time workers.  Because Dutch workers take longer vacations, this adjustment was larger in the 
Netherlands than in the United States.  Whereas the cross-over point using the Family Survey 
data was previously between the 20th and 25th percentile, the addition of the value of vacations 
pushes the cross-over point to between the 35th and 40th percentile. When the CPS is compared 
with the Dutch LIS/SEP, the Dutch situation is still more favorable, as the cross-over point rises 
to between the 50th and the 55th percentile.  The income lines of the two countries now track each 
other quite closely until about the 70th percentile, at which point they diverge. Furthermore, the 
mean adjusted income in the two Dutch surveys rises to 82% and 84% of the mean American 
value; in other words, the two adjustments equal roughly 1/3 of the overall difference between the 
mean household income in the Netherlands and the U.S.  Even though average well-being 
remains higher in the U.S., a substantial fraction of the Dutch population or even a majority 
(depending on the dataset) achieve a higher level of well-being than their American counterparts 
when country differences in the use of time are brought into the calculation. 
- Figure 6 about here - 
Discussion 
The stratification consequences of the welfare state has been a central concern of 
comparative research for decades.  The extent of inequality reduction was one of the three factors 
considered by Esping-Andersen (1990) in his assignment of countries to categories within his 
well-known typology.  However, his approach addresses only a limited aspect of the broader 
question of how national institutions shape both the level and distribution of a country’s quality 
of life.  It is limited both by an overemphasis on income and by a failure to address cross-national 
comparisons of well-being, which depend on country averages and within country-inequality as 
well as realistic measures of well being that can be applied across countries.  To limit attention to 
within-country inequality makes the problem easier, but it is ultimately unsatisfying.   
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A complete accounting of cross-national differences in well-being is probably beyond the 
scope of empirical research, and only partly because of the sheer complexity of the task.  A more 
fundamental theoretical problem is that people do not share the same preferences for life style 
even within countries and even within relatively homogenous subgroups of national populations. 
This limitation notwithstanding, we can go much further in the study of comparative welfare than 
is currently achieved in the literature, because many dimensions of modern life can be ranked at 
least as consistent with “western values” if not with the preferences of each and every member of 
society.  Thus, just as we generally allow that more income is better than less income, we also 
treat education and health as what economists would call “normal goods.” When the national 
welfare system provides in-kind services, the task for social science is to formulate methods for 
assessing their value to the population, which involves the assessment of the quality of the 
provided service and the inequality in its provision, so that the value of the service can be 
“added” to income measures in order to provide a more complete accounting of well-being.  The 
difficulty of solving this problem has yielded the default solution of omitting qualitative aspects 
of well-being that are of tremendous importance to the daily life of people and that vary 
systematically with different “varieties of capitalism” and different welfare states.   
There are a couple of reasons why this task has not proceeded very far as of now.  One 
reason is the inherent difficulty in assessing and “pricing” qualitative services such as health care 
or education.  Some of the problem also arises from fragmentation within social science.  
Research since the 1980s on “new social movements” identified issues such as the environment 
which clearly affect the national quality of life and which is distributed across the population in 
unequal amounts. Indeed, the growing research on communities identifies a host of quality of life 
issues such as crime, pollution, congestion, access to social services, quality of transportation, 
and various forms of “social disorganization.”  The “social exclusion” literature similarly 
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identifies a class of inequality-related metrics such as unemployment or child poverty, and cross-
national research routinely makes comparisons across countries on these metrics.  The use of so 
many metrics for portraying the many aspects of social welfare and social inequality from one 
perspective is just an acknowledgment of the multidimensional character of social life.  However, 
the literature has generally failed to establish the impact of these various dimensions on national 
well-being, on inequality in well-being, or on comparisons of well-being across countries. The 
literature is also far from measuring the tradeoffs between income and those aspects of life 
quality that are not readily reducible to market transactions. 
In this paper, we have privileged the issue of time use.  This choice is justified on several 
grounds.  The most obvious justification is the large difference in hours worked between 
Americans and many Europeans and the obvious impact of this difference on measures of GDP 
per capita.  Time is also more readily monetarized than are many important contributors to life 
quality such as health care or education.  The third reason is the irony inherent in the asymmetric 
treatment of goods and time in standard comparisons of national well-being that are based on 
income.   
In 1943, the psychologist Abraham Maslov asserted that humans possessed a “hierarchy 
of needs,” that higher needs were not activated until lower order needs were satisfied, and that 
what he termed the highest need, the need for “self-actualization” was often not accomplished 
through work.   Its satisfaction, in fact, often required the foregoing of income for “leisure” which 
would allow cultural and artistic pursuits.  This presumption that “self-actualization” was often 
best obtained outside of work – which is enshrined in economics in the Slutzky decomposition 
that posits offsetting “income” and “substitution” effects on leisure as a consequence of rising 
wages -- led to the prediction that average hours of work would diminish as societies became 
wealthier.  This prediction was borne out in western Europe, though not in the U.S., or at least not 
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during the “prime” working years.  During these years, which coincide with the normal time in 
the life course when adults raise children, the complaint in the U.S. has been less about 
inadequate time for “self-actualization” than about work-family conflict, which is felt most 
keenly by women with or without partner present who have children in the home (OECD 2004; 
see also Bianchi et al. 2006).  A considerable body of research has established that high levels of 
work hours and working separate shifts (which is related to the level of hours of work) are 
associated with marital problems for both men and women, which obviously has a negative 
impact on overall quality of life (Presser 2000; Crouter, Bumpass, Head, and McHale 2001; 
Gager and Sanchez 2003; Poortman 2005). 
 Our comparison focused only on part of the difference in working hours between the U.S. 
and the Netherlands, namely that portion which involves the different distribution of part-time 
workers in the ages 25-55 between the two countries. Our adjustment measure could have been 
extended further to consider the category of satisfied non-workers (including early-retirees), 
which, like part-time work, is a product of a country’s market and welfare-state characteristics.  
Involuntary non-employment is likely to be higher in more generous welfare states because of the 
higher tax wedge (which varies with the particular method by which social welfare benefits are 
financed), but at the same time voluntary non-work is likely to be higher in welfare states because 
higher social benefits give people the choice of not working without suffering severe financial 
hardship. The practical difficulty of adjusting the income of satisfied non-workers is that the 
wage rate of these non-workers is not readily observable. By limiting our adjustments for 
satisfied non-work only to those who were in the labor force, we provided a conservative 
assessment of the impact of different distributions of working time on the comparison of Dutch 
and American quality of life. 
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Our study focused only on two countries. However, the qualitative result of our study 
would probably be similar had we used France, Germany, the United Kingdom, or Norway, all of 
which have considerably higher levels of female part-time work than does the United States 
(OECD 2005).  Welfare states seem better capable of offering their population the number of 
working hours they wish because they protect their populations against economic privation. 
People who would not be happy in a full-time job because their health is not good or because they 
do not like to make heavy use of child care have the opportunity to choose to work fewer hours 
without encountering severe financial hardship.  The case of Israel, in contrast, is arguably an 
exception that at least supports the rule.  In Israel, the preferences of women have been shifting 
from part-time to full-time work, and this shift may have been driven at least partially by a 
reduction in welfare state benefits (Cohen and Stier 2006).  If we take this characteristic of 
welfare states into account when comparing living standards across countries, our tentative 
conclusion is that the aggregate gains in quality of life from working reduced hours offset at least 





1 This situation could arise if the bottom deciles of the more unequal country lived in extreme poverty while 
everyone else enjoyed slightly higher incomes than their counterparts in the more equal country. 
2 The data are from Gottschalk and Smeeding (1999), appendix table 1, and are taken from the Luxembourg Income 
Surveys for the U.S. in 1991, Belgium in 1992, the Netherlands in 1991, and France in 1984. 
3 The scaling is done under the simplifying assumption that the mean of the country distributions would be shifted 
up, but that the shape of the distributions would remain the same. 
4 We could instead frame the example as a joint choice of a woman and her partner, but the result is the same. 
5 It would also be possible for someone to incorrectly anticipate the full consequences of her choice of time over 
income.  In a context like that of the Netherlands, which is the empirical example of this paper, such mistakes can be 
corrected because labor demand is high, and therefore mobility between work and nonwork is relatively easy. 
6 CPS and LIS/SEP household income consists of earnings from wage and salary work, self-employment income, 
farm income, unemployment compensation, worker’s compensation, social security, supplemental security, public 
assistance, veteran’s benefits, survivor’s income, disability income, retirement income, income from interest, 
dividends, and rents, educational assistance, child support, alimony, financial assistance payments, the earned income 
tax credit, and other income, from which federal and state income tax, FICA, federal retirement, and property taxes 
were subtracted. See also http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/sumincvar.htm (downloaded April 5, 2007).  The Family 
Survey Dutch Population consists of the following income components: wage and salary work including bonuses, 
self-employed income, unemployment compensation, social security, disability income, (early) retirement income, 
old age pension, income from interest and dividend, alimony, study grants, allowance from parents. It are net 
amounts. Household income is the sum of net income of both spouses. 
7 Respondents were asked to indicate which of the 23 categories, ranging from less than 1,000 dollars to over 
110,000 dollars, reflected their personal net income. We randomly assigned an income to each respondent within the 
ranges from the category to which he or she belongs. For example, if a respondent indicated to earn between 20,000 
and 22,499 dollars a year, this respondent has been assigned an income that is randomly selected from all incomes 
between 20,000 and 22,499 dollars. The median income lies between 25,000 and 30,000 dollars. That is why we set 
the minimum income of the lowest category to 250 dollars (that is 1% of the median) and the maximum income of 
the highest category to 250,000 dollars (that is 10 times the median). We repeated the procedure of random 
assignment ten times, and considered the mean income of these ten rounds to be the original income.  We applied 
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Table 1: Hours worked per woker, hours worked per capita, GDP per capita, and GDP per hour worked 
for the United States and selected Western European countries (2005)     
             
  Hours worked per worker Hours worked per capita GDP per hour worked (USD) GDP per capita (USD) 
  total as % of US 
gap in % 
points total 
as % of 
US 
gap in % 
points total 
as % of 
US 
gap in % 
points total 
as % of 
US 
gap in % 
points 
Austria 1656 91 -3 836 97 -3 40.1 83 -17 33,569 80 -20 
Belgium 1534 84 -29 616 71 -29 52.9 109 9 32,549 78 -22 
Denmark 1551 85 -8 796 92 -8 43.3 90 -10 34,445 82 -18 
Finland 1714 94 -9 783 91 -9 40.1 83 -17 31,389 75 -25 
France 1 1546 85 -29 617 71 -29 49.0 101 1 30,245 72 -28 
Germany 1437 79 -22 677 78 -22 44.0 91 -9 29,758 71 -29 
Ireland 1638 90 -11 773 89 -11 50.5 104 4 39,034 93 -7 
Italy 1801 99 -14 747 86 -14 38.1 79 -21 28,471 68 -32 
Luxembourg 1557 85 21 1,051 121 21 64.7 134 34 67,976 163 63 
Netherlands 1367 75 -20 688 80 -20 50.1 104 4 34,457 82 -18 
Norway 1360 75 -21 680 79 -21 63.5 131 31 43,164 103 3 
Portugal 1685 92 -5 824 95 -5 24.1 50 -50 19,879 48 -52 
Spain 1669 92 -15 739 85 -15 36.9 76 -24 27,284 65 -35 
Sweden 1587 87 -12 761 88 -12 43.0 89 -11 32,683 78 -22 
Switzerland 1659 91 7 925 107 7 39.0 81 -19 36,058 86 -14 
United Kingdom 1669 92 -7 801 93 -7 40.1 83 -17 32,151 77 -23 
United States 1824 100 0 865 100 0 48.3 100 0 41,789 100 0 
1 Includes overseas departments          
Source: OECD Compendium of Labor Productivity. 2006        
Statistics for Austria are hours worked per job.         




Table 2: Main reasons not to work full-time         
         
  total 
I want to work 
same hours 
I want to work 
more hours 
I want to work 
fewer hours 
Dutch part-time workers (age 25-55) N % N % N % N %
I want to have enough time for household and caring tasks 583 64.6 452 66.7 50 51.5 81 63.3
I want to have enough time for hobby's etcetera 109 12.1 87 12.8 3 3.1 19 14.8
I cannot work more hours with this employer 50 5.5 23 3.4 22 22.7 5 3.9
Education or courses 27 3.0 20 2.9 6 6.2 1 0.8
Health problems 42 4.7 25 3.7 8 8.2 9 7.0
I have a second job 13 1.4 10 1.5 1 1.0 2 1.6
Other reason 70 7.8 55 8.1 6 6.2 9 7.0
Don't know 9 1.0 6 0.9 1 1.0 2 1.6
Total 903 100 678 100 97 100 128 100
           
  total men women    
Dutch adults who are out of the labor force (age 25-55) N % N % N %    
Insufficient child care facilities 9 1.3  9 1.5   
My family situation does not allow me 99 14.6  99 16.5   
I have other significant tasks at home 243 35.8 6 7.4 237 39.6   
I have other significant tasks outside the home 23 3.4  23 3.9   
Early retirement 2 0.3 2 2.4     
Health problems 240 35.3 65 83.0 175 29.1   
There will be no job for me anyway 14 2.0  14 2.3   
Social security benefit is sufficient to live on 2 0.3  2 0.4   
Other reason 46 6.9 5 7.1 41 6.9    
Total 678 100 78 100 600 100    




Table 3: Differences in work ethics between the United States and the Netherlands 
    
  US NL  
I only work as hard as I have to 8 7  
I work hard but only if it doesn't interfere with family life 37 64  
I work as best as I can even if this interferes with family life 55 29  
  100 100  
      
Proud of job and firm (scale score from 1 to 5) 3.5 2.6  
      
% (strongly) agree      
It is important in a job that income is high 80 58  
It is important in job that it offers opportunity to advance 89 79  




Table 4: Satisfaction with working hours in the Netherlands and the U.S. (percentages)   
             
Panel A: preference for working hours (if wage remains the same)           
  total men women        
  NL US NL US NL US             
more 7 32 4 38 10 28             
same 75 57 76 55 74 59        
less 19 10 21 8 16 13             
  100 100 100 100 100 100             
                 
Panel B: preference for working hours by working hours             
  total men women 
  NL US NL US NL US 
  part full part full part full part full part full part full 
more 12 2 35 32 13 2 62 36 12 2 26 28 
same 77 73 56 57 75 76 29 57 77 64 65 58 
less 11 24 9 11 13 22 10 8 11 35 9 14 
  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
                   
Panel C: distribution of preferred and current working hours           
  total men women        
  NL US NL US NL US             
part-time - more 5 5 1 5 9 6             
part-time - same 33 9 9 2 60 15        
part-time - less 5 1 1 1 8 2        
full-time - more 1 27 2 33 0 22        
full-time - same 42 48 67 52 14 45        
full-time - less 14 9 19 7 8 11             
  100 100 100 100 100 100             
Source: General Social Survey 1998 (U.S.) and OSA 2002 (the Netherlands)     
only working population between age 25 and 55; for Netherlands self-employed are excluded   




Table 5: Household incomes before adjustment, after satisfied part-time adjustment,  
after satisfied part-time and vacation adjustment     
           
  
Before adjstments   After satisfied part-time 
adjustment 
 After satisfied part-time 
and vacation adjustment
  US NL NL  US NL NL US NL NL 
  CPS1) LIS/SEP2) FNB3)   CPS LIS/SEP FNB  CPS LIS/SEP FNB 
5 2200 6465 6886 2250 6877 7325 2434 8247 8785
10 6647 10175 9028 7094 10808 9590 7503 12397 11000
15 8776 12129 9790 9198 12966 10466 9775 14755 11910
20 10626 13413 10641 10986 14345 11380 11474 16085 12760
25 12373 14405 11596 12787 15112 12165 13538 17068 13740
30 14054 15407 12685 14281 16372 13479 15222 18300 15067
35 15819 16493 13908 15864 17530 14783 16514 19385 16346
40 17577 17487 15013 17656 18385 15783 18704 20539 17633
45 19415 18340 15820 19474 19447 16775 20448 21534 18575
50 21261 19204 16804 21485 20842 18237 22384 22915 20051
55 23237 20165 17334 23285 22167 19055 24466 24255 20850
60 25276 21213 18163 25479 23139 19812 26878 25265 21632
65 27490 22161 19849 27997 24051 21542 28953 26112 23388
70 29893 23297 21564 30050 25699 23787 31589 27831 25761
75 32544 24475 23117 33288 26449 24981 34372 28585 26998
80 35625 25850 25367 35813 28163 27636 37302 30423 29855
85 39497 27720 27402 40212 30244 29897 41665 33025 32647
90 44998 29934 31027 46270 31316 32460 47820 34533 35794
95 53986 33113 37152 56480 35289 39593 58350 38101 42748
100 83614 45875 61084  84650 49746 66239 86878 52778 70276
Average 27320 20865 20310 27827 22311 21717 28927 24301 23654
  1.00 0.76 0.74  1.00 0.80 0.78 1.00 0.84 0.82
1) U.S. March CPS 2000         
2) Dutch LIS/SEP 1999         
3) Family Survey Dutch Population 2000       
top and bottom coded, size-adjusted equivalent disposable household income in 2000 US dollar 
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Figure 1. Generalized Lorenz Curves for the 


















Figure 2. Generalized Lorenz Curves, Scaling 
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Figure 3. Hypothetical distribution of the monetarized value





Figure 4. Ranked household size-adjusted disposable income of the U.S. and the Netherlands 






























Figure 5. Ranked household size-adjusted disposable income of the U.S. and the Netherlands in 
PPP-adjusted U.S. Dollars as of 2000, after adjusting for differences in desired part-time work, for 





























Figure 6. Ranked household size-adjusted disposable income of the U.S. and the Netherlands in 
PPP-adjusted U.S. Dollars, adjusting for differences in desired part-time work and the wage-






























Appendix A: Working hours in the Netherlands: choice or constraint?    
      
Satisfaction with working hours N %      
I want to work the same number of hours as I do now 1887 74.9    
I want to work more hours 148 5.9    
I want to work fewer hours 484 19.2    
        
  
I want to 
work more 
hours 
I want to work fewer 
hours   
Do you think you can realize your preferences within one year? N % N %  
yes 73 50.3 131 27.3  
no 49 33.8 300 62.5  
don't know 23 15.9 49 10.2  
        
Why do you think not to be able to realize your preferences? (more answers 
possible) N % N %  
My employer does not like this change 19 38.9 106 35.0  
My job does not allow this change 5 10.6 141 47.1  
Because of care for children 10 19.4 10 3.2  
Because of health 4 8.1 3 0.9  
Source: OSA 2002, employed population aged 25-55      
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